Drawing on leaked documents and other original sources in Arabic, this article examines the internal struggles over defining the Islamic State’s ideology during the period 2014 to the present. Since the Islamic State declared the caliphate in summer 2014, disagreements over doctrinal matters—primarily related to takfir (excommunication)—have sparked furious debates among different factions of the group. The earliest bout of infighting culminated in 2014 in the execution of a number of “extremist” scholars and activists. Infighting would reemerge in 2016, however, and grow increasingly more contentious, leading to the release of dueling pronouncements on takfir, the dismissal of numerous officials in the Islamic State’s executive council, and later their defection and flight from the group. The disaffected include both those who believe the group has become too extreme and those who believe it has become too moderate. The ideological incoherence in the Islamic State may well affect its long-term prospects.

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The academic literature on terrorism largely ignores micro-sociological explanations of violence. This is especially true in relation to the research concerning Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVE). This article provides a micro-sociological analysis of four high-profile terrorist attacks that occurred in the British cities of London and Manchester in 2017, which were carried out with deadly effect by HVE. The main focus of the article is the micro-dynamics surrounding each violent episode, although the article also recognizes the importance of the meso factors and macro motivations underpinning these violent acts. One of the central assertions of this article is that most humans dislike and are not particularly good at violence. As such, it seeks to understand how the individuals involved in these attacks could partake in such violence. It argues that most individuals must employ what we refer to as the principle of Attacker Advantage to commit violent acts, regardless of other factors and motivations.

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In a hectic consolidation phase plagued by security, economic and social challenges, Tunisia has stood out as the biggest sender of foreign terrorist fighters to the so-called Islamic State. How do grassroots forces frame the issue in the context of the democratic transition and post-revolutionary consolidating phase? In order to address this question, this article builds on fieldwork visits to Tunisia (including observation of the parliamentary elections in 2014 and background talks) and relies on a set of semi-structured interviews conducted from 2014 to 2017 with Tunisian civil society activists, students and young people, understood as voices representing grassroots. Though viewpoints from the grassroots agree on economic and social grievances as a motivating factor for Tunisian terrorist fighters, more emphasis is drawn to the ideological void filled in by the Salafi discourse after the Arab Spring and the need to replace the Tunisian understanding of Islam related to the Middle Way (el Wasatiyyah) in the political debate.

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Biographical data of terrorists and overlapping theories indicate that ostracism has the power to promote a terroristic mindset. This effect, however, has not been investigated empirically so far. The current studies aimed to fill this research gap and test this relationship experimentally. Inclusionary status was manipulated in an online and a lab study. To assess how far participants would go on behalf of a terrorist group, participants were introduced to a pro-democracy and animal protection terrorist organization, and asked for their degree of agreement to their actions. Study 1 showed that ostracized participants always favored more extreme options to support a terrorist group compared to participants in an inclusion or a neutral control condition, which grew from non-violent means to property damage. In Study 2, ostracism increased the willingness to destroy property on behalf of a terrorist group. Indicating an underlying mechanism, this effect was mediated by a low sense of control. The findings are consistent with theoretical and empirical work of both ostracism and terrorism research, and provide one of few pieces of experimental work to illustrate a root of radicalization.

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The extant literature speaks to the complexity involved in terrorist radicalization, yet has been unduly focused on jihadists. This is especially problematic given that other ideologically motivated movements have demonstrated a larger threat to the US homeland, like that of right-wing extremists. In addition, few US-based studies have focused on the role that one potentially important factor may have in these processes: that of the family. We seek to rectify this gap in the research by examining two “typical” case studies: Jerry Jr. and Joseph Kane. Informed by a social learning and social structure framework (SSSL), we find several instances where this primary group both created and reinforced definitions favorable to terrorism.

The post The radicalization of the Kanes: family as a primary group influence? appeared first on Radicalisation Research.

Terrorism represents a major threat to global security; however, psychosocial risk factors for terrorism are insufficiently explored in the literature. Using a cross-sectional design, we examined group differences in family, childhood, and personality factors, and attitudes towards terrorism among individuals convicted of terrorism (n = 160); those convicted of murder (n = 65); and a control group (n = 88). Using regression models, we consequently analyzed the risk factors for group membership, with a focus on terrorism. Compared to controls, terrorists had higher odds of persistent childhood disobedience, a conduct disorder factor, and endorsing statements on the causes of and justifications for terrorism, but lower odds of harsh treatment as a child. Murderers had greater odds of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD), of endorsing statements on the causes of and justifications for terrorism, but lower odds of being easily provoked and harsh treatment before age 15. Compared to murderers, terrorists had higher odds of endorsing statements on the causes of and justifications for terrorism, but lower odds of ASPD, having a family member murdered, and being easily provoked. Although psychosocial risk factors for terrorism overlap significantly with violent criminal behaviors, certain factors may help distinguish terrorists from other groups. These factors merit further investigation.

The post Risk factors for terrorism: a comparison of family, childhood, and personality risk factors among Iraqi terrorists, murderers, and controls appeared first on Radicalisation Research.

Jihadism is a complex social phenomenon that changes people, but not always uniformly. This article argues that cognitive and behavioral radicalization can be seen as a discursive journey or jihadiship involving (e)merging ideas, problems, and solutions that change with encounters with new circumstances—both material and immaterial. The differences observed between various generations of jihadists are one manifestation of this complexity. Especially in a jihadi group, the processes of radicalization are bound to continue and take new forms, compared with those experienced in the West. Another example of the complexity of jihadiship is that not only can radical ideas lead to radical behavior, but also radical behavior can increasingly give rise to radical ideas in jihadi groups.

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The patriot/militia movement in the US has grown in prominence over the past several years, with the movement engaging in high-profile conflicts with law enforcement (e.g., at the Bundy Ranch standoff in Nevada in 2014) and political opponents (e.g., clashing with antifascist activists in Boston and Berkeley in 2017). One of the strategies movement leaders use to solicit support is to ground their goals and behaviour in American history. This article presents a case study of one striking example of this, where a leading figure in the movement (Mike Vanderboegh, who popularized the idea of the Three Percenters) attempted to justify his advocacy of violating the law by simultaneously claiming the legal legitimacy of nullification and the moral legitimacy of civil disobedience. I argue that this rhetoric is an example of strategic frame appropriation. This type of frame appropriation serves the purpose of legitimating violent resistance to government by drawing parallels to other forms of political activism that are widely respected.

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This article reports and discusses the results of a study that investigated photographic images of children in five online terrorist magazines to understand the roles of children in these groups. The analysis encompasses issues of Inspire, Dabiq, Jihad Recollections (JR), Azan, and Gaidi Mtanni (GM) from 2009 to 2016. The total number of images was ninety-four. A news value framework was applied that systematically investigated what values the images held that resulted in them being “newsworthy” enough to be published. This article discusses the key findings, which were that Dabiq distinguished different roles for boys and girls, portrayed fierce and prestigious boy child perpetrators, and children flourishing under the caliphate; Inspire and Azan focused on portraying children as victims of Western-backed warfare; GM portrayed children supporting the cause peacefully; and JR contained no re-occurring findings.

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Economic and political trends of the last decades resulted in a general rise in anti-minority populism in Hungary. Anti-minority sentiments have been manifested in violence primarily against the Roma, but also against other target groups. The aim of the current study is to reveal the social psychological mechanisms of justifying intergroup violence against outgroups representing a symbolic or a physical threat. Considering that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) can legitimize violence agsainst threatening outgroups, we hypothesized that RWA would be more important in explaining justification of intergroup violence than a general propensity for radical action. We tested our hypothesis using computer-assisted personal interviews using a representative sample of 1000 respondents. Using structural equation modelling, we found that RWA was a much stronger predictor of the justification of intergroup violence against both physically and symbolically threatening groups than propensity for radical action. Furthermore, a comparison of the groups also revealed that those who justify violence against symbolically threatening groups were also higher in right-wing authoritarianism. These findings highlight that RWA justifies politically motivated aggression against different target groups in Hungary.

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Images are known to have important effects on human perception and persuasion. Jihadist groups are also known to make strategic use of emotive imagery and symbolism for persuasive ends. Yet until recently studies of the online magazines published by violent jihadist groups largely focused on their textual, not their image, content and, while the image content of these magazines is now the subject of a burgeoning number of studies, few of these compare the images used by different groups. This article accordingly offers a cross-group comparison, examining the image content of a total of thirty-nine issues of five online magazines published by four different jihadist groups. Starting with a content analysis, it shows that the images’ most common focus is non-leader jihadis. Using a news values analysis, it then shows how these images of non-leader jihadis are used to visually construct the identity of a “good Muslim.” This construct is characterized by three traits, each corresponding to a different news value: fulfilled (personalization); active (consonance); and respected (prominence). Moreover, these traits are intertwined: fulfillment comes from responding actively to the call to violent jihad, which in turn promises respect. The article concludes by highlighting some subtle differences between how the news values of personalization, consonance, and prominence are realized in the different magazines, and by discussing the implications of the “good Muslim” construct for efforts to develop countermessages.

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This book critically engages with the contemporary breakdown of trust between Muslim and non-Muslim communities in the West. It argues that a crisis of trust currently hampers intercultural relations and obstructs full participation in citizenship and civil society for those who fall prey to the suspicions of the state and their fellow citizens. This crisis of trust presents a challenge to the plurality of modern societies where religious identities have come to demand an equal recognition and political accommodation which is not consistently awarded across Europe, especially in nations which view themselves as secular, or where Islamic culture is seen as alien.

This volume of interdisciplinary essays by leading scholars explores the theme of trust and multiculturalism across a range of perspectives, employing insights from political science, sociology, literature, ethnography and cultural studies. It provides an urgent critical response to the challenging contexts of multiculturalism for Muslims in both Europe and the USA. Taken together, the contributions suggest that the institutionalisation of multiculturalism as a state-led vehicle for tolerance and integration requires a certain type of trustworthy ‘performance’ from minority groups, particularly Muslims. Even when this performance is forthcoming, existing discourses of integration and underlying patterns of mistrust can contribute to Muslim alienation on the one hand, and rising Islamophobia on the other.

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Outside the Al Huda Mosque, Dunedin | Mark McGuire | CC BY 2.0

While it is difficult to look beyond the atrocities committed in New Zealand, that they were perpetrated by someone inspired by the extreme right reminds us of the very real threat such ideologies and those committed to them pose to our ongoing safety and security. Described by the Australian prime minister, Scott Morrison, as an “extremist, right-wing, violent terrorist”, the Australian national arrested after the two attacks on Christchurch mosques that killed at least 50 people confirmed much the same in a manifesto uploaded to the internet shortly before the shooting spree.

While much has been made of the Islamophobic nature of the attacks, a deeper look at the suspect and his manifesto afford an insight into how the extreme right wing is not only increasingly dependent upon social media but would also seem to be moving away from rather more fixed and traditional ideologies.

Social media as a message generator

The attacks on the two Christchurch mosques are sadly, of their time. This is readily apparent from the sharing of photos of weapons by the suspected attacker via Twitter days before the attacks and the livestreaming of the attacks as they happened. Neither were by chance. In today’s social media age, the attacker knew that doing so would ensure his actions had the greatest possible impact. By bypassing traditional media outlets – which would report the story albeit after everything had gone viral – social media enabled the opportunity to ensure a pure and unadulterated message reached as large an audience as possible. And it was initially shared, copied and reposted far quicker than governments, security services and social media providers themselves could remove it.

All acts of terrorism function as “message generators” but in our social media age, messages can be generated more immediately and directly than would have been possible even a decade ago.

While the use of social media to speak directly to others who share the same beliefs is a more recent phenomenon, the outline of the suspected attacker’s motivation, inspiration and justification in a manifesto – unequivocally motivated by Islamophobia, racism, xenophobia and anti-immigration sentiment – are recurrent themes found in traditional far-right nationalism and the established ideologies of the extreme right wing. Citing mass migration, high birth rates and the “replacement” of “European people” – those he refers to as ethnically and culturally white – the Christchurch attacker claimed his actions were ultimately necessary to stop, what he referred to as “white genocide”. Anders Behring Breivik who did something similar shortly before detonating a bomb in Oslo killing eight and then shooting 69 on the island of Utøya back in 2011.

The manifesto also clearly speaks to another group of like-minded people: those that frequent the darker realms of the internet. Referred to as “shiposting” – described by journalist Robert Evans as the posting of ironic content online with the purpose of provoking an emotional reaction among the “less internet savvy” – the manifesto contains a lot of “in-jokes” designed to send up or create the moral outrages that have blamed child killing on “video nasties” or high school shootings on the music of Marilyn Manson.

Examples of this include the claim that the video game Spyro the Dragon 3 taught the attacker all he needed to know about ethno-nationalism while Fortnite taught him how to kill. Another good, but less obvious, example of this is the claim that Candace Owens – an American conservative activist – was the person whose position had radicalised the attacker the most, with the aim of sparking others, especially those within the mainstream media, to point an accusatory finger at Owens and blame her for the attacks. This is exactly what happened. In a tweet, Owens said “it should go without saying but neither myself … or Spyro the Dragon had anything to do with the tragedy in New Zealand”.

How the extreme right has changed

Charlottesville “Unite the Right” Rally | Anthony Crider | CC BY 2.0

What is clear about the extreme right wing today is that it is far removed from the stereotypical “football hooligan”, and “feet on the street” image of the far right in the 1970s and 1980s. While street protests by groups such as Britain First continue to reinforce this image, the reality of the extreme right wing is that it thrives online.

The right is creating and constructing content-specific platforms from which their chosen ideologies can be shared. Take for instance Rebel Media, a Canadian-based website that has been accused of having become a global platform for those espousing Islamophobic and right-wing ideologies. While no one on the platform espouses content justifying the Christchurch massacre, much of what is said has some resonance with parts of the content contained in the manifesto released before the attack.

Individuals on the right are also increasingly functioning akin to social media influencers. Instead of promoting brands or products to large numbers of followers (consumers) across the world, charismatic figures such as Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (aka Tommy Robinson) are promoting ideas and ideologies to transnational, right-wing consumers. The similarities are real.

And of course, one cannot overlook the role and function of 4chan, 8chan and others and the outer recesses of the web –– and the dark web – where the most extreme and vile forms of extreme right-wing ideologies and thinking not only find form but also find affirmation. It is maybe a little premature to cast the removal of Generation Identity from Facebook as a major win despite the racist group sharing aspects of an “identitarian” ideology with the attacker, one that includes the need to defend Europe and its culture in the face of mass migration.

Traditional ideologies are increasingly informed and shaped by a much wider range of sources that cut and paste large tracts from traditional nationalist and right-wing sources. Breivik’s manifesto, for example, was supplemented with references to America’s Unabomber, as well as the British journalist Melanie Phillips, Dutch politician Geert Wilders, Top Gear presenter Jeremy Clarkson and the Belgian orientalist Koenraad Elst, among others.

The Christchurch attacker did similar, citing Brexit, British fascist Oswald Mosley, Donald Trump, American white supremacist Dylann Roof, and the perpetrator of the terror attack on London’s Finsbury Park Mosque, Darren Osborne. Today, an outspoken television presenter can clearly be as influential to those on the extreme right wing as historical figures such as Adolf Hitler.

Today’s extreme right wing is therefore rather more “pick’n’mix” than traditionally loyal. Akin to how sociologist Grace Davie used the phrase to describe how people were increasingly “consuming” religion as they were other “markets” – pulling together different things from different religious traditions to explain their own beliefs – so the same would appear to be true of the extreme right wing in regards to understanding, informing and justifying their own personal ideologies.

Combine this with the ever-changing landscape of the internet and social media and the likelihood is that extreme right-wing ideologies will not only become ever more diversified and difficult to understand but will so too find an increasingly diversified and complex way through which they are shared, engaged and worryingly, enacted on also.

Dr Chris Allen is Associate Professor in Hate Studies at the University of Leicester

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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This article argues for recognition of fringe fluidity as a distinct radicalization pathway. Most studies on individual-level radicalization examine how relatively normal people come to accept violent extremist beliefs. But some people who come to accept and act on an extremist ideology transition from the embrace of one form of violent extremism to another—and understanding their prior extremism is essential to appreciating their ultimate beliefs and actions. The article demonstrates the existence of fringe fluidity by detailing the pathway between neo-Nazism and militant Islamism. Factors allowing fringe fluidity between these ideologies include recent cases of individuals who transitioned from one to the other or simultaneously embraced both; some ideological overlap, particularly in shared out-groups; and historical precedent that allows some adherents to reconcile inconsistent aspects of the two ideologies. Despite this article’s focus on neo-Nazism and militant Islamism, fringe fluidity is likely more widely applicable beyond the context of these two ideologies.

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New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern travelled to Christchurch after the terror attacks | NZ Prime Minister’s office | CC BY-SA

As an immigrant to New Zealand, I am saddened and outraged by the events in Christchurch. The apparent innocence of New Zealand has been stripped away by acts of cowardice and evil.

Police remain on high alert and authorities are still responding to events following the shootings at two mosques in Christchurch that took the lives of 50 people and seriously injured many more. Three people have been arrested, and one, an Australian living in New Zealand sporadically, has appeared in court on murder charges.

My research focuses on how members of a majority perceive a growing immigrant population, and what we can all do to keep fear and hatred in check.

Migrants target of hate

The alleged gunman (whom The Conversation has chosen not to name) is a self-identified white supremacist. Before the attacks he posted an 87-page manifesto online. In his manifesto and social media accounts, he refers to the rise of Islam, and to towns and cities being shamed and ruined by migrants.

He posts photos of ammunition, retweets alt-right references and praises other white supremacists. The manifesto includes references to “white genocide,” which is likely a reference to a conspiracy theory embraced by the alt-right and white supremacists that “non-white” migration dilutes white nations.

The gunman’s motivations seem to echo those of other white supremacists who have committed similar atrocities: the Pittsburgh synagogue shooter, the Charlottesville attacker, the Charleston church shooter, and attackers in Sweden, Quebec and Norway.

In each of these cases, the attackers voiced hatred toward minorities or immigrants and expressed a belief that their way of life, the “white” way, was being destroyed by these groups who were infiltrating their societies.

Over the past decade, my team has conducted research in India, France, Finland, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, analysing how members of the dominant group perceive minorities and immigrant groups. The research has shown that many dominant group members, often white Christians in the countries studied, express fear of immigrants in their nations. In particular, respondents have voiced fear of immigrants changing their cultural, political, and economic way of life.

Combating fears to reduce hate

Normally such fears are benign and lead only to misunderstanding or lack of interaction. But as we have seen too often, they can lead to prejudice, hatred and much worse.

Recently, such fears have become more visceral with the proliferation of social media platforms. With the use of social media, individuals can easily find others who share their feelings, and therefore not feel alone. The ability to find a community that shares one’s feelings provides a sense of security and validates ones fears and feelings of hate.

In our increasingly connected world, it’s essential we take steps to combat these fears to reduce the chances of such atrocities happening in the future. First, how families talk about minorities and immigrants is critical. In work that we conducted in Finland, we found prejudicial opinions of Finns toward Russian immigrants are largely shaped during adolescence. It’s incumbent upon parents to be role models for their children and adolescents and to promote tolerance and mutual respect early.

Second, in an increasingly computer-mediated world, it is our shared responsibility to challenge racist and hateful cyber messages. If you see a YouTube clip that you deem abusive or offensive, report it.

Third, the more contact we have with each other and learn about one another, the less likely we are to fear one another. This may sound trite, but the more we know about other groups, the more likely we are to pass that information onto one another and improve overall social cohesion. In turn, we are better able to identify and challenge those bent on dividing society. It is our collective responsibility as diverse societies to recognise our diversity and to face the psychology of hate that would attack our home and us.

Stephen Croucher, Professor and Head of School of Communication, Journalism, and Marketing, Massey University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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In this research, we analyzed extensive life history interviews and open-source data on a sample of 35 current and former white supremacists. These individuals had all committed ideologically motivated violence, some of which clearly exhibited a greater degree of planning, who we termed the “planned violence” sample while those in the “spontaneous violence” sample had committed more opportunistic violence, such as “wilding-style” attacks on available victims. Using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), we examined whether there were important differences in the presence and combination of prior risk factors, such as offending history, truancy, delinquent peers, family members involved in extremism, a lower- or working-class childhood and academic failure, which led to the outcome condition of either planned or spontaneous violence. Our findings demonstrated differences between the two samples, with the spontaneous violence sample demonstrating higher risk than the planned violence sample. However, no support was garnered for the identification of distinct pathways of homogeneous risk factors among either sample of violent offenders.

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This article contributes to public and policy debates on the value of social media disruption activity with respect to terrorist material. In particular, it explores aggressive account and content takedown, with the aim of accurately measuring this activity and its impacts. The major emphasis of the analysis is the so-called Islamic State (IS) and disruption of their online activity, but a catchall “Other Jihadi” category is also utilized for comparison purposes. Our findings challenge the notion that Twitter remains a conducive space for pro-IS accounts and communities to flourish. However, not all jihadists on Twitter are subject to the same high levels of disruption as IS, and we show that there is differential disruption taking place. IS’s and other jihadists’ online activity was never solely restricted to Twitter; it is just one node in a wider jihadist social media ecology. This is described and some preliminary analysis of disruption trends in this area supplied too.

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This article provides a comparative analysis of lone-actor terrorist radicalization from a relational perspective. Extant research on lone-actor terrorism has shown that lone actors are rarely as “lone” as public perceptions suggest. In most cases, lone-actor terrorists have some social ties to established radical groups. Accordingly, this article asks (1) why these individuals do not integrate into the radical groups they frequent and engage in collective violence, and (2) if they do integrate, why do they then end up engaging in violence on their own? The article argues that patterns of lone-actor terrorist radicalization can be categorized according to the extent and evolution of their loneness. It highlights two broad patterns of lone-actor radicalization in relation to broader radical groups/movements – peripheral and embedded – and explores the reasons why some lone-actor terrorists remain peripherally integrated in radical groups, while others become more embedded only to engage in violence alone. The article is based on qualitative research, drawing on a geographically and ideologically diverse sample of cases (N = 25), and access to restricted material. The article identifies and theorizes five recurrent radicalization trajectories, which are variations of the peripheral and embedded patterns, and discuss the implications for prevention/interdiction.

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Through a case study of a mosque in Los Angeles, I examine how changing constructions of space affect the ways a religious community comes together to engage faith. I show how as the neighborhood was undergoing dramatic change, so too were the ways believers at the mosque interpreted Islam. I divide my analyses into three parts, following the major chronological shifts of religious praxis in this African American Muslim community: (1) early days as members of the Nation of Islam (1950–1975); (2) ‘transition’ from the Nation to Sunni Islam in the mid 1970s; (3) and the post-transition period of rebuilding that continues into the present day. Together they produce a historical interaction effect of economic, demographic (immigration) and internal religious changes that lead to current dilemmas mosque members must address.

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Journal abstract
The extant literature speaks to the complexity involved in terrorist radicalization, yet has been unduly focused on jihadists. This is especially problematic given that other ideologically motivated movements have demonstrated a larger threat to the US homeland, like that of right-wing extremists. In addition, few US-based studies have focused on the role that one potentially important factor may have in these processes: that of the family. We seek to rectify this gap in the research by examining two “typical” case studies: Jerry Jr. and Joseph Kane. Informed by a social learning and social structure framework (SSSL), we find several instances where this primary group both created and reinforced definitions favorable to terrorism.

The post The radicalization of the Kanes: family as a primary group influence? appeared first on Radicalisation Research.

Most groups do less violence than they are capable of. Yet while there is now an extensive literature on the escalation of or radicalisation towards violence, particularly by ‘extremist’ groups or actors, and while processes of de-escalation or de-radicalisation have also received significant attention, processes of non- or limited escalation have largely gone below the analytical radar. This article contributes to current efforts to address this limitation in our understanding of the dynamics of political aggression by developing a descriptive typology of the ‘internal brakes’ on violent escalation: the mechanisms through which members of the groups themselves contribute to establish and maintain limits upon their own violence. We identify five underlying logics on which the internal brakes operate: strategic, moral, ego maintenance, outgroup definition, and organisational. The typology is developed and tested using three very different case studies: the transnational and UK jihadi scene from 2005 to 2016; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and the animal liberation movement in the UK from the mid-1970s until the early 2000s.

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This Research Note is a follow up on an similar one, published under the title ‘Terrorism Events Data: An Inventory of Databases and Data Sets, 1968-2017’ in Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. XI, Issue 4 (2017). While the previous inventory covered 60 databases and data sets, this one describes 30 in the same three categories:

(i) Academic, Think Tank and Independent Databases (n =21)
(ii) Commercial Databases (n = 5) and
(iii) Governmental Databases (n =4).

Most of these data refer to terrorism, yet a few are broader, covering other forms of political violence as well as armed conflicts.

The present inventory, as well as the previous one, reflects the increasing availability of quantitative terrorism related data. The format for some of these databases and data sets has changed considerably over the years. The simple chronological design and linear nature of early terrorism events data sets from the late 1960’s has been transformed by technology into an array of 21st century relational database systems, with sophisticated front-end web-based interfaces. However, the integrity of terrorism data must be the cardinal principal before the application of smart user interfaces. In other words, one should not confuse attractive visual databases on terrorism data with greater accuracy and authority. Classic simple data sets built on sound methodological design (e.g. items 6, 10 and 15 below) can have as much quantitative and qualitative value when compared with more modern web-based counterparts.

Thorough and rigorous design methodology and validity checks produce data that researchers can have confidence in. When researchers can combine the trinity of rigour, database functionality and sophisticated web-based design, the results can be an authoritative and powerful database system (e.g. item 17).

The terrorism databases and data sets outlined below present an eclectic mix of generalised terrorism events data and more niche subject areas of terrorism and political violence. Many are generated from open source data (e.g. items 1, 9 and 14). Increasingly, some commercially based organisations are providing subscriptionbased services that charges clients for terrorism related information and data (e.g. items 22, 25 and 26). These commercially based services often provide clients with bespoke terrorism intelligence and data required by companies operating or setting up businesses within terrorism and conflict affected regions of the world. The paucity of local terrorism and intelligence data gatherers in these regions provide an opportunity for specialist companies such as Control Risks (item 22) to fill a vacuum that generalised terrorism databases and data sets do not cover.

Development of new terrorism database systems is not the sole domain of universities, think-tanks and commercial providers. American and European governments have a long-established tradition in developing their own terrorism database systems. However, the recent creation by the Government of Pakistan of its own National Counter Terrorism Database (item 28) indicates a move by some governments outside the northern hemisphere to generate their own ‘home-grown’ database systems. Consequently, country co-operation between national counter-terrorism database systems in conjunction with trusted reciprocating partners, can provide intelligence and law enforcement agencies with richer intelligence data.

The entries below offer a representative cross-section of terrorism databases and terrorism data sets that should ISSN 2334-3745 52 October 2018 PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 12, Issue 5 be of use to researchers in terrorism studies. The list is not definitive. Additional terrorism databases and data sets will be listed in a future Research Note in this journal by the same compiler. Hopefully, by then there should be also some databases on counter-terrorist operations available – currently one of the lacunae in the field.

In most cases, the entries are clickable links to the data storage sites. All website links have been validated as of 7 October 2018.

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West German society faced the emergence of a new calibre of right-wing terrorism in the 1970s. Right-wing terrorist groups evolved that showed themselves willing and able to commit violent attacks such as bombings and murder. This article explores the genesis and development of right-wing terrorism in West Germany between 1970 and 1980 while examining 22 identifiable groups and lone actors and taking into consideration the radicalization within the far right as well as the prevailing social conditions. West German right-wing terrorism until 1990 has remained a blind spot in historiography to this day. This article contributes to historical terrorism studies as well as to studies into the far right while applying historical-qualitative methods and interpreting primary sources. Using an approach informed by social history, this paper sheds new light on the individual participants, groups, and networks of right-wing terrorism as well as on its topics and targets. While taking into account a more dynamic definition of right-wing terrorism, this paper disengages from definitions that identify terrorism solely as a threat to the state itself. This makes possible a multidimensional approach employing contemporary history and studies in both terrorism and right-wing extremism.

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Previous studies have found evidence that terrorism negatively impacted tourism in individual countries, but studies with larger number of countries have found less evidence for this negative linkage. The Caribbean tourist area provides an excellent region for a more nuanced analysis of the effects of terrorist on tourist visits. Evidence from analyses of selected Caribbean countries that rely on tourism indicated that terrorism did not affect tourist visits before the twenty-first century. After 9/11, however, there were indications that territories suffering from terrorism had reductions in visits by tourists. This significant event did influence tourist visits to the Western Hemisphere in the aftermath of this major terrorist event. There were also indications that foreign investment, which is linked to the tourism sector, was negatively affected after 9/11. In at least some cases there are regional effects on tourism from terrorist attacks.

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